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Philanthropy means to give for the benefit of
others. Unfortunately for philanthropy and civil
society, the laws supporting philanthropy are in a
state of crisis. More by happenstance than design,
the law now caters overwhelmingly to the whims
of wealthy donors to the detriment of those in
need. We find ourselves with a legal framework
ostensibly designed to promote broad-based
philanthropic activity, but which is better
described as a framework where the wealthiest
get tax benefits that are unavailable to others;
claim those (sometimes questionable) benefits
while retaining effective control over donated
funds; and use the system to advance their policy
preferences, avoid scrutiny, and undermine the
centuries-old faith and trust that our nation’s
charities represent the public good. Although the
trends are dire, Congress can take steps to
broaden the base for charitable giving, improve
the flow of money to working charities,
strengthen oversight, and restore credibility to
philanthropy.

support even the noblest of causes, the payment is
not a gift and would not be philanthropic.
Likewise, gifts in support of a terrorist
organization, even if voluntary, would fail as
philanthropy because the cause falls outside
mainstream ideas of what is worthy of support.
Federal law has long recognized and provided
support for both these aspects of philanthropy. On
the giving side, for over 100 years, the charitable
deduction has encouraged giving by reducing its
cost. If a dollar given to charity costs the donor
only 63 cents (the current maximum subsidy),
donors can afford to and will give more. On the
worthy cause side, federal law defines a charity as
being for specific purposes (for example,
charitable, educational, religious, and scientific),
and limits some types of activities (for example,
no political campaigning). The rules are meant to
define the outer boundaries of a worthy cause and
ensure that charitable dollars are used for public
good and not mainly to benefit donors or other
private interests. Both planks of federal support
for philanthropy, however, are at a breaking point.
A Broken Giving Incentive
Consider first the charitable deduction.
Although it is widely credited with encouraging
giving, it has also been criticized as a tax break for
the wealthy that serves the policy preferences of
vested interests through their control of the purse
strings.1 This criticism recently has taken on
startling new force. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
sliced by more than half the number of people

Two Sides to Philanthropy
Meaningful philanthropy has two key aspects:
a voluntary sacrifice (or gift) and a worthy cause.
If someone is compelled to make a payment to
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1

Several recent books relay this theme. See Rob Reich, Just Giving:
Why Philanthropy Is Failing Democracy and How It Can Do Better (2018)
(discussing the ways in which philanthropy is a plutocratic voice);
Anand Giridharadas, Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the
World (2018) (describing philanthropy as “elite led, market-friendly,
winner-safe social change”); and David Callahan, The Givers: Money,
Power, and Philanthropy in a New Gilded Age (2018) (discussing the power
wielded by wealthy philanthropists).
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who will claim the deduction (an astonishing 21
million fewer people).2 Thus, we have gone from a
country where roughly 20 percent of taxpayers
participated in the giving incentive to one where
just the top 9 percent of taxpayers will receive a
3
tax break for their gifts.
Setting aside the effect this change will have
on giving totals (one estimate puts the loss at $17.2
4
billion), even more important is the impact a
shrunken base of participation will have on the
future of philanthropy. By providing a giving
incentive for just the wealthiest, the policy signal
is that the values of the charitable deduction —
altruism, pluralism, civic participation — should
be rewarded only when undertaken by the
wealthy.5 It is ironic (and even insulting) that the
federal government pays for more than one-third
of the cost of gifts by the wealthiest 9 percent of
taxpayers; but gifts by everyone else receive no
subsidy. This disparity will solidify the giving
incentive as just another tax planning tool for the
elite and erode the pluralistic values that make
our civil society a national asset.
The ultimate strength of the charitable
incentive is in fostering diversity in the charitable
sector through a wide range of individual
support. The broader the base of that support, the
more diverse, pluralistic, and independent the
sector becomes. By shrinking the base of the
charitable deduction to the top 9 percent (plus
corporations!),6 the philanthropy that emerges
will strongly reflect the philanthropic preferences
of this elite group, meaning a nonprofit sector
created by the better off in society, for their causes.
Philanthropy will increasingly become a selfserving vanity project for one segment of society,
and less worthy in a true philanthropic sense.

2

Joseph Rosenberg and C. Eugene Steuerle, “Reforming Charitable
Tax Incentives: Assessing Evidence and Policy Options,” Tax Policy
Center (Nov. 15, 2018).
3

Id.

4

Alex Brill and Derrick Choe, “Charitable Giving and the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act,” American Enterprise Institute (June 2018).
5

See Roger Colinvaux, “The Importance of a Participatory Charitable
Giving Incentive,” Tax Notes, Jan. 30, 2017, p. 605.
6

Christopher Ingraham, “Massive New Study Traces How
Corporations Use Charitable Donations to Tilt Regulations in Their
Favor,” The Washington Post, Jan. 17, 2019.
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A Charitable Giving Credit
The solution is a giving incentive for all
taxpayers. Legislation has been introduced in
Congress that would provide a so-called
universal deduction. The basic idea is simple and
correct: Let everyone claim a charitable giving
incentive. But in its current form the idea is more
rhetorical than real. An unlimited, universal
giving incentive would cost billions in taxpayer
dollars, a very hard sell given that budget deficits
are already closing in on $1 trillion.
Further, an unlimited incentive would be
wasteful and inefficient. A tax incentive should
not reward all giving, much of which will occur
regardless of tax breaks. A sensible approach
would be to reward gifts exceeding a minimum
amount (a floor) — this would encourage the
extra giving that might not otherwise occur and
reduce the revenue and administrative costs of an
expanded incentive. In short, an incentive for all
taxpayers triggered by a minimum amount of
giving could increase giving, broaden the base of
participation, and need not cost the sun and the
moon.
But charitable giving policy should not stop
there. Simply to open the existing door wider is to
ignore festering problems inside that should be
fixed. One issue that has long dogged the
charitable deduction is that it provides different
rewards based on income level, with the wealthier
getting more. Under the deduction, if a taxpayer
makes a $1,000 gift, the amount of the tax break
varies widely. The subsidy could be $370, $320,
$220, $120, or $0, depending on which tax bracket
the taxpayer is in and whether the taxpayer
itemizes deductions. This is unfair. Further, the
amount of the tax break changes as tax rates
change, making giving more expensive when
rates go down and cheaper when rates go up,
regardless of the amount that would generate the
most giving. Rather than this inequitable, ad hoc
system, it would make more sense to provide a
uniform benefit, say 25 percent of the gift. A fixed
amount would be fairer and more transparent to
taxpayers, which in turn could result in greater
giving at less cost.
This could be accomplished by replacing the
deduction with a credit. A tax credit for the
charitable giving of all taxpayers, subject to a
floor, would be a bold step toward fairness,
TAX NOTES, MARCH 4, 2019
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transparency, and efficiency. It would unleash
charitable giving to reflect the interests of the
American people, not simply those with the most
resources.
To address concerns that a floor might wipe
out the incentive for many middle-income
donors, there could be different floors depending
on income level. For example, for high-income
taxpayers, a floor as a percentage of the taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income (say 2 percent) might make
sense. For lower-income taxpayers, a lower
percentage or even a dollar-based floor should be
considered.7 The objective would be to set the
floor at an amount that would be transparent and
not so high as to reward only extraordinary giving
levels.

because the law permits donors to deduct
untaxed appreciation and avoid capital gains
10
tax.
Assuming that policymakers are not ready to
limit the charitable giving incentive to cash gifts
11
only or to limit the ability to deduct untaxed
gains,12 another option would be to better align the
giving incentive with the public benefit provided
by the gift. Instead of basing the tax benefit on the
appraised value of donated property, the benefit
should be based on the amount made available
13
after sale. Doing so would at least make certain
that scarce taxpayer dollars are not being used to
subsidize gifts of questionable value and that the
subsidy matches the net amount that working
charities receive.14

Reform In-Kind Giving

Making Philanthropy Work for Philanthropy

Another important if less well-known issue
lawmakers should address is in-kind giving (that
is, gifts of property). In-kind giving is a billiondollar industry. In 2015, for example, in-kind
contributions were about $64 billion, or nearly
8
one-third of the amount of all contributions.
Indeed, some charities are set up substantially to
solicit and then sell property contributions and
9
distribute the proceeds. Right now, taxpayers can
give almost anything to charity (interests in a
private company, jewelry, a stuffed game trophy,
or cryptocurrency, for example) and receive a
deduction for the full appraised value, even if the
value later plunges, the charity incurs significant
costs to maintain or sell the property, or the
charity does not want the property but accepts it
to avoid antagonizing a donor (or even to
facilitate tax abuse). Unfortunately, many
property gifts cheat the government because the
deduction is based on the appraised value (which
may have to be litigated), not the amount made
available after sale. Further, the deduction for inkind giving is an extra boon for the wealthy

Fixing the charitable giving incentive to make
it fairer, more widely available, and less prone to
abuse would be a huge improvement, but that
would address only part of the problem facing
philanthropy.
The other part is that the boundaries that have
long been designed to keep excessive private
influence out of the charitable sphere are under
constant strain and attack. The combination of
open-ended legal standards, weak enforcement,
partisan pressure, and the rise of new giving
vehicles have all contributed to a weakening of
the “worthy cause” side of philanthropy. The
philanthropic scale is becoming tilted in favor of
donors and private interests, to the detriment of
the causes that philanthropy is meant to serve.

See Calvin H. Johnson, “Ain’t Charity: Disallowing Deductions for
Kept Resources,” Tax Notes, Aug. 2, 2010, p. 545.
11

For additional discussion, see Colinvaux, “Charitable
Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined,” 50 Harv. J. on
Legis. 263 (2013).
12

See Colinvaux, “Donor Advised Funds: Charitable Spending
Vehicles for 21st Century Philanthropy,” 92 Wash. Law Rev. 39 (2017)
(arguing that if the deduction for in-kind giving is retained, the tax
benefit be limited to the lesser of the net benefit to charity from the gift or
the donor’s tax basis plus one-half of the untaxed appreciation).
13

7

A dollar-based floor or floors (for example, only gifts exceeding
$500 get the benefit) would be transparent to taxpayers, who would
know at the start of each year exactly when the incentive would begin.
8

10

IRS, “Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions, Tax Year 2015.”

9

Fidelity Charitable, for example, in 2015 reported receiving $2.95
billion in noncash contributions. See generally David Gelles, “How Tech
Billionaires Hack Their Taxes With a Philanthropic Loophole,” The New
York Times, Aug. 3, 2018 (discussing ways that donors use donor-advised
funds (DAFs) for in-kind property contributions).
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This is the approach that applies to car donations. See section
170(f)(12).
14

If noncash gifts are allowed as part of any expansion of the giving
incentive, it is natural to expect the many problems associated with inkind giving to multiply, making the need for reform even more pressing.
One approach might be to keep the current itemized deduction largely
intact (but with a new floor) while allowing a non-itemizer, cash-only
credit — subject to a floor (or floors). Such an approach would, however,
retain the inequity of current law by providing greater benefits to
wealthier donors.
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Limit Donor Control and Improve Transparency
The problems here are so varied that a neat
summary is impossible. To start, however, one
critical area for common-sense solutions reflects
the phenomenal rise of a new giving vehicle — the
donor-advised fund (DAF). DAFs are financial
accounts managed by a sponsor (like Fidelity
Charitable, Schwab Charitable, or Vanguard
Charitable). A donor contributes to the sponsor
(in cash or property) and takes a tax deduction,
and the sponsor opens an account in the donor’s
name. The donor then decides when to distribute
money from the account to a charity. Money in
DAFs can remain there indefinitely because there
is no requirement that DAF contributions be spent
at any specific time. DAFs resemble charitable
checking accounts — the donor gets the tax
benefit immediately but writes the check later, if
ever.
DAFs matter because they now dominate
charitable fundraising, representing roughly 10
percent of gifts. In 2017 Fidelity Charitable was
the No. 1 charity in the United States, raising $6.83
billion, more than twice as much as the United
15
Way. Altogether, the top four DAF sponsors
raised more in 2017 than the top 10 working
charities — that is, active groups like the Salvation
16
Army — combined. In short, billions of dollars
are going to conduit charities each year, waiting to
be put to use at the donor’s say-so, but after the
donor has already taken a tax deduction. Notably,
recent tax law changes will help ensure that
DAFs’ share of the giving pie will continue to
grow because donors now have incentives to
bunch several years of contributions into one year
17
to get a deduction for their gifts.
Although the DAF structure is legal, at bottom
DAFs give donors too much power to decide
when to make distributions. The payout rate — or
the rate of spending from DAF accounts — is
often touted as a sign of health in the DAF
industry. This is because aggregate payout rates

are high when compared with private
foundations. The National Philanthropic Trust,
for example, reports a payout rate for 2017 of 22.1
percent across all DAFs, with a similar rate for
prior years.18 There is, however, no agreed method
for determining payout rate. If the denominator of
the payout ratio is changed from prior year asset
value (which the National Philanthropic Trust
uses) to payout year asset value plus grants
(which reflects current year contributions) the
payout rate for 2017 drops substantially from 22.1
percent to 14.9 percent.
Further, one major limitation in the data is that
it is collected on an aggregate basis, not an
account basis, meaning that all payout
calculations are averages. So even if a DAF
sponsor boasts a payout rate of 20 percent, this
could mean that for every one DAF account that
pays out all contributions in the year of the
contribution (a 100 percent payout rate) there are
four DAF accounts that pay nothing. In other
words, average payout rates reflect a wide array
of high and low payout rates per fund. One
researcher, for example, estimates that in 2012,
over a quarter of DAF organizations had roughly
a 4 percent payout rate with “466 organizations
19
that reported no grants paid out at all.”
Also, there are built-in constraints that can
deter spending the money invested in DAF
accounts. When DAF sponsors (or affiliated
entities) earn fees based on amounts under
20
management, they have a financial incentive to
retain funds. When this is combined with the
human tendency to procrastinate on tough
decisions and to save for the future, there is
reason to be concerned that the institutional
default of the DAF industry is toward
21
accumulating, not spending. Moreover, even
when money goes out of a DAF relatively quickly

18

See National Philanthropic Trust, 2018 Donor Advised Fund Report

18.
19

15

Drew Lindsay, “America’s Favorite Charities 2018,” Chron. of Phil.
(Oct. 30, 2018).
16

Id.

17

As discussed above, the increase in the standard deduction means
that many taxpayers will not ordinarily spend enough in a given year to
get a tax benefit for charitable gifts. As a response, many taxpayers are
likely to defer their giving and bunch many years’ worth of gifts together
into one year to exceed the standard deduction and obtain a tax benefit.

1010

Paul Arnsberger, “Donor-Advised Funds: An Overview Using IRS
Data,” Boston College Law School Forum on Philanthropy and the
Public Good (Oct. 2015).
20

See Alan M. Cantor, “Donor-Advised Funds and the Shifting
Charitable Landscape: Why Congress Must Respond,” 134-136
(unpublished manuscript).
21

See James Andreoni, “Who Benefits From Donor Advised Funds?
Insights From Behavioral Economics,” University of California, San
Diego working paper (May 2016) (discussing the endowment and other
effects from behavioral economics as giving “the donor the incentive to
wait before spending the money from the DAF”).
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(say within four years of the initial contribution),
there is a social cost to the delay because that
money cannot be put to active use. The longer that
money sits unused in a DAF, the longer that
urgent needs of working charities and those they
serve go unmet.
The purpose of these accounts is, or should be,
to raise and promptly distribute money for
charity, not to become foundations of wealth for
future generations to spend.22 And yet DAFs are
becoming a form of institutionalized deferral of
charitable activity without any input or
discussion from Congress as to their appropriate
role. Congress should carefully consider whether
DAFs are serving the public interest and the
philanthropic sector as a whole. Are charities and
their beneficiaries better off from having
enormous sums of money pass through a
financial intermediary? Do DAFs actually
increase charitable giving in substantial enough
23
amounts to justify their costs? At a minimum,
Congress should weigh whether to impose a
requirement that all DAF contributions be put to
use within a reasonable time, say five to seven
24
years. A reasonable spending rule would not
disrupt the ease of giving and convenience of
DAFs, and working charities would have a
reliable and steady influx of needed cash, from all
DAFs.25

22

See Drummond Pike, “How I Helped Create the Donor-Advised
Fund Monster — Inadvertently,” Chron. of Phil. (Aug. 22, 2018)
(describing how DAFs are essentially “mini-private foundations”).
23

See Andreoni, “The Benefits and Costs of Donor-Advised Funds” in
32 Tax Policy and the Economy (2018) (arguing that to be cost-effective,
DAFs should in the aggregate generate in the range of 16 to 30 percent of
new charitable giving, but there is “little evidence that DAFs are
encouraging significantly more giving over a policy of no DAFs”).
Andreoni points out that a main use of DAFs is to avoid capital gains tax
on appreciated assets, which can cost new revenue loss without any new
charitable giving. For example, with DAFs, a donor has a strong tax
incentive to give appreciated property instead of cash to wash out the
capital gain and use the cash to repurchase the asset.
24

See, e.g., Chuck Collins, Helen Flanner, and Josh Hoxie, “Report:
Warehousing Wealth: Donor Advised Charity Funds Sequestering
Billions in the Face of Growing Inequality,” Inst. Pol’y Studies (July 25,
2018); and Ray Madoff, “Three Simple Steps to Protect Charities and
American Taxpayers From the Rise of Donor-Advised Funds,” Nonprofit
Q. (July 25, 2018).
25

Not all DAF sponsors are the same. The largest have commercially
affiliated sponsors (such as Fidelity, Schwab, and Vanguard). Others are
housed within community foundations or operating charities (such as a
university). One issue for Congress to address is the extent to which the
type of DAF sponsor is relevant in determining any spending rule. See
Colinvaux, “Defending Place-Based Philanthropy by Defining the
Community Foundation,” 2018 BYU L. Rev. 1 (2018) (discussing the
extent to which community foundations are distinguishable from
commercial DAF sponsors).
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There is also a darker side to DAFs. The very
flow-through nature of a DAF means that it can be
used to launder money and avoid transparency in
26
charitable giving. A focus here are private
foundations, which typically are set up by
wealthy founders or families. Because of the
inherent possibilities for abuse through family
control of the foundation, Congress 50 years ago
established a separate legal regime for
foundations to ensure that the assets are used for
public good. For example, foundations must
publicly disclose their major donors so the public
can trace foundation funds. But if a foundation
pays to a DAF, and then advises a payment from
the DAF, disclosure and accountability are
avoided. Thus, if a right- or left-leaning
foundation wants to back a cause without telling
27
people, it can hide behind a DAF intermediary.
Relatedly, foundations can also use a DAF to
avoid their legal obligation to spend a minimum
amount on charity each year. Foundations
28
commonly make grants to DAFs, which
technically counts as spending, even though the
foundation retains advisory privileges and does
not ever have to distribute the money from the
DAF. Foundation-to-DAF grants are yet another
way that money can remain under effective
control of the donor without getting to working
charities.
There is an easy fix to these loopholes. Private
foundations either should not be allowed to count
distributions to DAFs as spending, or must spend
any such distributions quickly and, in any event,
with full flow-through disclosure.

26

Alana Semuels, “The ‘Black Hole’ That Sucks Up Silicon Valley’s
Money,” The Atlantic, May 14, 2018.
27

See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the
Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right 205-207 (2016) (describing
private foundations’ use of DAFs to fund a policy campaign against
climate science); and Robert O’Harrow Jr., “Project Veritas Received $1.7
Million Last Year From Charity Associated With the Koch Brothers,” The
Washington Post, Dec. 2, 2017 (describing the Koch Foundation’s use of a
DAF).
28

See Mark Harris, “How Elon Musk’s Secretive Foundation Hands
Out His Billions,” The Guardian, Jan. 23, 2019 (describing a $37.8 million
gift from the Musk Foundation to Vanguard Charitable in a year when
the foundation’s payout was high); “A Philanthropic Boom: ‘DonorAdvised Funds,’” The Economist, Mar. 23, 2017 (noting that in a random
sample of foundations, some gave more than 90 percent of their money
to DAFs).
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Problems of Enforcement and Administration
So far, the problems discussed that plague the
charitable sector are concrete enough to allow for
fairly straightforward solutions, assuming there is
political will to act. More difficult to tackle are
problems of enforcement and administration.
There are more than 1.3 million charities, with
tens of thousands of new ones formed every year
29
(nearly 80,000 in 2017). To address a backlog in
applications for charitable status, the IRS in 2014
introduced a short form application, the Form
1023-EZ, which has so streamlined the process
that small new charities can easily form with little
understanding of their legal obligations, and bad
actors can just as easily use the short form to game
30
the system. Further, there are hundreds of
thousands of other nonprofits, which include
social welfare groups like the NRA, the ACLU,
and AARP. The division of the IRS charged with
oversight has seen its budget slashed and has
been under attack for more than five years for its
bungled attempt at overseeing the political
31
activity of nonprofit groups. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the audit rate for charities is
infinitesimally low. The IRS reports that taxexempt organizations filed 1,528,487 returns in
2017 (including the Form 990 series and other
returns) and that of these, about 3,678 were
audited, for an audit rate of 0.24 percent, or onequarter of 1 percent.32
And even if the IRS was looking, legal
violations are not always clear and are easy to

29

For example, the IRS reports that in 2017, 79,699 new charities
(section 501(c)(3) organizations) were approved while 68 were
disapproved. IRS, Table 24a, “Closures of Applications for Tax-Exempt
Status, by Organization Type and Internal Revenue Code Section, Fiscal
Year 2017.”
30

The Taxpayer Advocate Service lists this new form as one of the
most serious problems in tax administration. See TAS, “Annual Report to
Congress 2017, Most Serious Problems Encountered by Taxpayers,
Exempt Organizations: Form 1023-EZ, Adopted to Reduce Form 1023
Processing Times, Increasingly Results in Tax Exempt Status for
Unqualified Organizations, While Form 1023 Processing Times
Increase,” vol. 1, at 64 (2017).
31

See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, “In Targeting Political Groups, I.R.S.
Crossed Party Lines,” The New York Times, Oct. 5, 2017.

disguise. Here is an archetype of possible abuse.
A wealthy individual sets up a “charity,” and
funds the group with tax-deductible
contributions (perhaps even from the founder’s
DAF to get around being classified as a private
foundation). The founder sits on the board and
hires his son to be CEO, paying him handsome
compensation, for which the son “manages” the
money. If the founder is politically motivated, the
charity might grant charitable funds to a dark
money group, ostensibly for “social welfare”
purposes, that uses the money to intervene in
political campaigns. The charity might also hold
and manage private business interests of the
founder (for which the founder took a deduction),
make loans to family members that are never paid
back, or contract with the founder’s company. If
these scenes sound familiar, it is because one or
another variant of them has been featured in
unfavorable news reports about charities.
A well-publicized recent illustration involves
a charity called Foundation for Accountability
and Civic Trust (FACT). FACT employed
Matthew Whitaker before his appointment as
acting attorney general. FACT’s stated mission is
to work for accountability and ethics in
government. Public filings show that from its
founding in 2014 through 2017, FACT received
virtually all of its funding from Donors Trust, a
section 501(c)(3) organization and a sponsor of
DAFs. If the donations had come directly from
one individual instead of through a DAF, FACT
would have been classified as a private
foundation and subject to tougher rules. Overall,
donations from Donors Trust were $3,450,000, of
which $1,219,000 was paid to Whitaker as salary
(for 39 months’ work). The rest was paid to a
handful of private entities, one of which had the
33
mission of defeating Democrats. Importantly,
this apparent misuse of section 501(c)(3) can be by
actors on the political right or left.34
Some of the problems of private benefit and
influence over charities are endemic to the system.
The law has always allowed charities to form

32

This number is not exact because the returns filed include one form
(Form 8872) not reflected in the audit figure and the audit figure
includes two forms (forms 1041-A and 1120-POL) not reflected in the
return figure. See IRS, “Returns Filed, Taxes Collected & Refunds
Issued,” at Table 2, “Number of Returns and Other Forms Filed, by Type,
Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017”; and IRS, “Enforcement: Examinations,” at
Table 13, “Returns of Tax-Exempt Organizations, Employee Retirement
Plans, Government Entities, and Tax-Exempt Bonds Examined, by Type
of Return, Fiscal Year 2017.”
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33

See O’Harrow, Shawn Boburg, and Aaron C. Davis, “Conservative
Nonprofit With Obscure Roots and Undisclosed Funders Paid Matthew
Whitaker $1.2 Million,” The Washington Post, Nov. 20, 2018.
34

Treasury is considering rules to address the use of DAFs to avoid
private foundation treatment. See Notice 2017-73, 2017-51 IRB 562.
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based on their purposes, which can be very broad.
Keeping the criteria for worthy causes broad
helps to ensure pluralism within the sector and
avoids the IRS having to make politically charged
and substantive determinations of what is in the
public interest. But a porous border also means
that bad actors can abuse the charitable form, and
that groups that are more about propaganda than
education — and business rather than charity —
35
can operate under a charitable guise.
While there is no easy answer, Congress can
do some things that could help. One is to leave
alone the rule that prohibits charities from getting
involved in political campaigns. To allow the
repeal or weakening of this rule (lately called the
Johnson Amendment) would be devastating to
the independence of the sector from partisan
36
money flows. Part of what makes philanthropy
work is our collective belief that on balance,
charitable organizations are not self-serving or
partisan. If charities are allowed to campaign in
elections, this basic belief will be shattered, and
we will all be worse off.
Some strongly believe that endorsing
candidates in elections is central to the mission of
some charities, particularly evangelical churches.
This may be a sincerely held view, but it should
not dictate the norms of the entire charitable
sector. If possible, Congress should try to find a
way to accommodate the concerns of this
minority of charitable organizations, without
adopting a rule that undermines the integrity of
the charitable sector or that further involves the
IRS in regulating campaign activity, as last year’s
(and now this year’s) proposed legislation would
37
have done.
Congress could also take steps to improve
enforcement outcomes. One simple and costeffective measure would be to require the
electronic filing of the information returns (Form
990s) that charities and other nonprofits must file.
Electronic filing would enhance oversight of the

35

Katie Thomas, “Drug Maker Pays $360 Million to Settle
Investigation Into Charity Kickbacks,” The New York Times, Dec. 6, 2018.
36

National Council of Nonprofits, “Community Letter in Support of
Nonpartisanship” (Sept. 5, 2017); Letter to Congress by 103 Religious
Leaders Opposing Politicization of Houses of Worship (Nov. 13, 2017).
37

See Colinvaux, “The House Tax Bill Could Be the End of Charities
as We Know Them,” Chron. of Phil. (Nov. 16, 2017) (discussing the Free
Speech Fairness Act).
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sector because this public information would
become available on a more timely basis and
would be much easier to access and administer —
38
by the public, the news media, and the IRS.
Further, Congress could show support for the
oversight function of the IRS regarding
nonprofits, with more funding and less partisan
posturing. Political support from the taxwriting
committees in Congress would help IRS efforts to
protect charitable assets from private corruption
and deter bad actors. And if Congress is unwilling
to be a constructive partner in the enforcement
challenges the IRS faces, it should convene a panel
to study whether oversight responsibilities
should be taken out of the IRS altogether. The IRS
is primarily a revenue collection agency, not a
39
nonprofit regulator. This means that when it
comes to tax-exempt organizations, the IRS has
few incentives to enforce the law and significant
challenges in doing so, which as recent history has
40
shown can lead to a national political firestorm.
Better Legislation
Congress also needs to get smart. In the TCJA,
Congress cited the importance of a robust
charitable sector, but at the same time passed
provisions that seem wrong, overbroad, or not
thought through (or all three), and that add
indescribably high compliance costs to groups
that are unequipped to cope (nor should they
have to).

38

See, e.g., Government Accountability Office, “Tax-Exempt
Organizations: Better Compliance Indicators and Data, and More
Collaboration With State Regulators Would Strengthen Oversight of
Charitable Organizations,” GAO-15-164, at 41 (Dec. 2014) (concluding
that expanded e-filing could result in “more accurate and complete data
becoming available in a timelier manner” and would permit outside
stakeholders with more and better information to “improv[e]
transparency and accountability.”).
39

For a discussion of IRS oversight of the tax-exempt sector, see
Evelyn Brody and Marcus Owens, “Exile to Main Street: The IRS’s
Diminished Role in Overseeing Tax-Exempt Organizations,” 91 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 859; and Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour Is
Discretion: Should the IRS Change or Surrender Its Oversight of
Charitable Organizations?” 7 Col. J. Tax L. 80 (2016).
40

Joe Davidson, “IRS Chief Departs, Blasting Congress for Budget
Cuts Threating Tax Agency,” The Washington Post, Nov. 7, 2017
(Commissioner John “Koskinen had repeatedly warned Congress about
the dangers of shortchanging the agency. . . . But Republicans were intent
on penalizing the IRS because they said it had improperly scrutinized
right-leaning organizations.”); Andy Kroll, “How the IRS Chief Went
From Respectful Public Servant to Political Punching Bag,” The
Washington Post, Mar. 2, 2017.
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The leading example is a tax on nonprofits for
providing free parking to employees.41 Congress
said the tax would “make the tax system simpler
42
and fairer for all businesses.” The fairness
rationale presumably comes from the fact that
elsewhere in the act, Congress removed the
deduction that for-profit businesses get for
providing free parking. But “fair” or equal
treatment between a nonprofit when performing
its nonprofit functions and a for-profit business
makes no sense. There is not meant to be a level
playing field, which is why nonprofits get tax
43
exemptions in the first place. The result is that
now every nonprofit (including churches, which
have been vocal in their opposition) that provides
free or discounted parking to employees must
determine the cost of the parking and perhaps file
44
a tax return for the first time. This provision is a
mistake and should be promptly repealed before
any more time is wasted by nonprofits and the IRS
in implementation.
A slightly less egregious example of poor
legislating relates to the unrelated business
income tax, which is a tax on the for-profit
activities of nonprofits (a true “leveling the
playing field” tax). Ironically, here, Congress has
now adopted a rule that treats nonprofits worse
45
than for-profit businesses. For-profits generally
may aggregate income and expenses across
different trades or businesses. Until the TCJA,
nonprofits were treated similarly regarding their
unrelated business income. But now the code says
that nonprofits must calculate the net income or
loss from each business separately (called siloing)
and may not measure their aggregate business
income or loss. Not only is this an unfair way to
measure income, but it treats nonprofits worse
than for-profits, which runs against the level

playing field rationale Congress seemed to care
about in other provisions. Further, the new
approach is incredibly complicated because
nonprofits now must determine how to classify
distinct trades or businesses, which no one knows
46
how to do.
The reasoning for the new UBIT approach has
47
its roots in a 2013 IRS study. This study, however,
pertained to only one segment of the nonprofit
sector — an audit sample of 34 colleges and
universities. Yet the siloing provision applies not
only to every section 501(c)(3) organization (not
just colleges and universities), but also to all other
nonprofits, including social welfare groups, labor
unions, and trade associations. More importantly,
the main problem that the IRS identified in the
study was the improper allocation of expenses
and losses from nonprofit business to for-profit
businesses, which was already prohibited
(resulting in the IRS adjusting the income of the
audited group). In short, the new siloing
approach is a vastly overbroad remedy to an issue
of unknown scope that imposes highly significant
compliance costs on the nonprofit sector.
Congress should repeal this and return to the
drawing board.
Setting aside the wisdom of the parking tax
and the UBIT siloing rule, the broader point is that
increasing the compliance burden on nonprofits
and charging the IRS with enforcement of unclear
provisions is not the best use of nonprofit or
48
government resources. These provisions were
rushed through, and perhaps the need to repeal
them can serve as an opportunity for serious
consideration of issues that do need legislative
attention. Congress can do better; the nonprofit
sector deserves better.

41

Section 512(a)(7).

42

H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, at 266.

43

The way the provision was drafted is nonsense. The tax is imposed
as a tax on “unrelated business income,” but the tax applies only to the
related parking activity of the nonprofit and not to unrelated business
parking activity. In other words, the provision purports to impose a tax
on related, charitable activity by deeming it an unrelated business
activity. That makes sense only in a world where up is down and left is
right. Sadly, this is an assault on rational lawmaking.
44

Notice 2018-99, 2018-52 IRB 1067 (providing “interim guidance for
taxpayers to determine the amount of parking expenses for qualified
transportation fringes”). A glancing read of the notice quickly
undermines Congress’s simplicity rationale for the tax.
45

Section 512(a)(6).
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See Notice 2018-67, 2018-36 IRB 409 (36 pages providing interim
guidance on the siloing provision).
47

IRS, “Colleges and Universities Compliance Project Final Report”
(May 2, 2013) (selecting 34 of 400 colleges and universities for exam
based on responses to a questionnaire).
48

Other provisions in the TCJA impose high compliance costs
without a clear rationale and, even if directed to a valid policy concern,
should be revisited. The new excise tax on excess compensation, for
example, sends a strong political message that salaries at nonprofits
should not exceed $1 million (even if the compensation is reasonable),
but there are existing provisions that address excess compensation that
could have been strengthened in lieu of this new tax, which has
remarkably complex implications. See Notice 2019-9 (92 pages of interim
guidance).
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Time to Act
The charitable sector is at the edge of crisis.
Fortunately, there are steps Congress can take:
strengthen the giving incentive by making it
available to more people within sensible limits;
eliminate waste in the deduction for in-kind
contributions; unlock the money available for
distribution to working charities with a
reasonable spending rule for DAF contributions;
and improve transparency and foster more
spending from private foundations by limiting
foundation-to-DAF transfers. Congress can also
strengthen the worthiness of the charitable sector
by retaining the historic separation of politics
from charity; mandating the electronic filing of
information returns; providing adequate funding
for oversight; and revisiting the rushed-through
ideas in the TCJA.
The approaches outlined here will not solve
all the problems, and other ideas should be
explored, but it is critically important that
policymakers and stakeholders in the nonprofit
sector look beyond their own interests and
commit to take steps to improve both the giving
and worthy cause sides of philanthropy.
A healthy and vibrant charitable sector is in
the national interest and should be an area where
common-sense solutions can be reached. Perhaps
in the 116th Congress, our leaders will come
together and take the steps necessary to make
philanthropy work, for all Americans.
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